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1 The actual scheme
makes use of agents to act
on behalf of the parties,
but since our attacks work
regardless of this detail,
we shall simply concen-
trate on the parties.
CONSUMER COMMUNICATIONS AND
NETWORKING SERIES
INTRODUCTION
The issue of location privacy of mobile users is
frequently addressed. This is because users are
unwilling to have their locations tracked while
they roam the mobile network since this would
intrude on their privacy. One of the ways to
guarantee the location privacy of users is to use
anonymous IDs.
Recently, in the May 2004 issue of this maga-
zine, He et al. [1] presented an authorized anony-
mous ID-based scheme that eliminates the need
for a trusted third-party server, in contrast to
previous work that depended on it. Their scheme
exploited the concept of blind signatures [2] to
generate authorized anonymous IDs for mobile
users.
In this article we show the security limitations
of He et al.’s scheme. In particular, we show that
their scheme allows several attacks: imperson-
ation attacks by any malicious mobile user against
the administrator and by any malicious adminis-
trator against the user, and a nontrivial denial of
service (DoS) attack by anyone against the user.
All these attacks are variants of the replay attack,
which is the most basic attack against which any
security protocol must guard [3]. Such attacks
are devastating since they are so easy to mount
(they merely involve replaying previous messages
and having them considered valid by legitimate
parties) and mostly passive [4] in nature (and
indeed this is the case for our impersonation
attacks), and thus almost impossible to detect or
trace. Being susceptible to such attacks is a criti-
cal failure of the scheme to achieve its main
objective of establishing mutual authentication
among legitimate parties.
We also discuss in detail which weaknesses of
the scheme we are exploiting in our attacks and
further suggest countermeasures to guard against
them. Our countermeasures are very feasible
since they require only slight changes to the
existing scheme by introducing extra information
(timestamps or information about the sender
and receiver) in a few communicated messages,
or simply including an extra response message.
We briefly review He et al.’s scheme. Then
we present our attacks on the scheme and sug-
gest countermeasures that can overcome the cur-
rent limitations of the scheme. We then conclude
the article.
THE SCHEME OF HE ET AL.
The authorized anonymous ID-based scheme of
He et al. consists of the following parties1 (also
illustrated in Fig. 1):
• Administrator, A: The administrator authen-
ticates legitimate users and grants them
access to the mobile communication net-
work it is overseeing.
• Mobile user, U: Any user of a mobile device
who wishes to gain access to the mobile
communication network administered by A.
• Connector, C: An access point delegated by
A to authenticate the Us; it controls con-
nections between Us and the network.
Before we proceed to describe the two proto-
cols, we define additional notation to be used
throughout this article.
The scheme makes use of both symmetric-
key cryptosystems and public-key cryptosystems
[4]. A symmetric-key cryptosystem allows two
parties wishing to communicate secretly to use
a secret key shared between them to encrypt
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and decrypt messages for each other. Both
encryption and decryption use the same secret
(symmetric) key. In contrast, a public-key cryp-
tosystem requires that each party own a pair of
keys, a public key (broadcast to everyone) and
a private key (known only to the party who
owns it). Encryption with a public key can only
be decrypted by its corresponding private key,
and vice versa.
When party A wishes to send a confidential
message to party B, it encrypts the message with
the public key, EB, of B, thus ensuring that only
B can decrypt it with its private key, DB. When
party A wishes to prove that a message is indeed
generated by itself, it decrypts (signs) the mes-
sage with its private key, DA. Then anyone can
verify that the message came from A by encrypt-
ing (verifying) this with A’s public key, EA.
The authorized anonymous ID-based scheme
proposed by He et al. [1] consists of two phases
specified by two corresponding protocols: the
registration protocol and the controlled connec-
tion protocol. The registration protocol is to
authorize a mobile user, U, who applies for an
authorized anonymous ID from the administra-
tor, A. Meanwhile the controlled connection pro-
tocol is to control access of the network to only
legitimate and authorized users. Here, the
mobile user, U, presents his/her obtained autho-
rized anonymous ID to an access point connec-
tor, C, in order to request connection. This ID is
also used to authenticate the packets from the
mobile user, U, to the access point connector, C,
for access control purposes.
REGISTRATION PROTOCOL
A summary of the steps in the registration pro-
tocol is shown in Fig. 2.
The registration protocol assumes that an
infrastructure such as a public key infra-
structure (PKI) [4] is already in place and
allows for the initial authentication of parties.
Therefore, the mobile user, U, must digitally
sign its request, c0, using its private key, DU,
before sending it to the administrator, A. Upon
reception of this request message (c0, DU(c0)),
A’s action of authenticating U would be to veri-
fy DU(c0) by encrypting it with U’s public key,
EU and checking that the resulting value equals
the received c0.
At the end of this protocol, the mobile user,
U, has obtained his authorized anonymous ID,
id = DA(H(r1)), which will be used in the next
phase whenever he wishes to request access to
the network at any access point connector, C.
CONTROLLED CONNECTION PROTOCOL
The steps in this protocol are summarized in
Fig. 3.
Whenever the mobile user, U , wishes to
access the network at an access point connector,
C, it initiates the controlled connection protocol
by sending an access request, c2, to C, which it
immediately forwards to the administrator, A.
The administrator decrypts the access request
message using its private key, DA, and proceeds
to verify the authenticity of this decrypted value.
It then encrypts this with the secret key, KCA,
that it shares with the access point connector, C,
and sends this back to C .  Upon receipt, C
decrypts the message and also verifies its authen-
ticity. Then it generates and sends the ack mes-
sage to the mobile user, U, signifying that access
has been granted to U. Thereafter, the access
point connector, C, and U can communicate with
each other by sending authenticated packets
between them.
ATTACKS ON THE SCHEME
In this section we describe three different attacks
on He et al.’s authorized anonymous ID-based
scheme.
n Figure 1. Parties involved in the authorized anonymous ID-based scheme.
Controlled connection 
protocol
Administrator (A)
Wireless network
Controlled connection protocol
Registration
protocol
User (U)
Access point
connector (C)
n Table 1. Notation used in this article.
id Authorized anonymous ID of mobile user U
ack Acknowledgment of the last received message
r0, r1 Random numbers
KXY(m) Symmetric key encryption of m using secret key shared between X and Y
KXY–1 (c) Symmetric key decryption of c using secret key shared between X and Y
H(x) One-way hash function with input x
EX Public key of party X
DX Private key of party X
EX(m) Public key encryption of m with public key of X
DX(c) Public key decryption of C with private key of X
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IMPERSONATION ATTACK BY
MALICIOUS USER AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR
We first show an attack that can be mounted by
a malicious mobile user U against the adminis-
trator A such that U can gain access to any other
network of which A is a user.
In more detail, suppose that U is a legitimate
user on a network, N1, of which A1 is the admin-
istrator. Furthermore, suppose that A1 is a legiti-
mate user on another network, N2, of which A2
is the administrator. This is a typical scenario
since diverse mobile and wireless networks are
allowed to coexist in our current information
age, and is depicted in Fig. 4.
The malicious mobile user U’s intention is to
impersonate A1 as a legitimate user to adminis-
trator A2 in network N2. In other words, U would
like to generate an id authorization request mes-
sage, c0′, of its own, as a function of its own cho-
sen random numbers, r0′ and r1′:
c0′ = EA2(r0′) × H(r1′). (1)
However, in order for this to be authenticated
by administrator A2 and appear to have really
come from A1, note that U also needs to obtain
the value of DA1(c0′) so that it can complete
forming the id authorization message (c0′ ,
DA1(c0′)). Surprisingly, this is very easy to achieve.
Since U is a legitimate user of network N1, it
simply forms the message (c0′, DU(c0′)) to A1 as
an apparent id authorization request in the reg-
istration protocol session of network N1. Since
A1 is administrator of network N1, it will verify
the authenticity of the message, which will be
successful since U is a legitimate user. The
administrator A1 then computes c1′ = DA1(c0′)
and returns this to the mobile user U, and there-
fore U has successfully used the administrator A1
as a decryption (signing) oracle to compute the
value DA1(c0′). U is now able to form the com-
plete message (c0′, DA1(c0′)) to administrator A2
in the registration protocol session of network
N2, and would successfully be authenticated to
A2 as the legitimate A1 when in fact A1 did not
initiate the protocol session at all. This is an
impersonation attack by mobile user U against
administrator A1, and allows U to act as a legiti-
mate user of network N2.
IMPERSONATION ATTACK BY
MALICIOUS ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST USER
Suppose that U is a legitimate user of two net-
works, N1 and N2, where A1 and A2 are the
administrators, respectively, and A1 is a legiti-
mate user of network N2. This scenario is depict-
ed in Fig. 5.
At the end of the registration protocol in N1,
the legitimate user U would have successfully
used its chosen random numbers, r0 and r1, to
obtain its authorized id.
We emphasize the critical information
derived by administrator A1 from both the regis-
tration and controlled connection protocols with
user U in network N1. After the registration pro-
tocol, A1 knows r0 × DA1(H(r1)). After the con-
trolled connection protocol, A1 further knows
the value of r1 and DA1(H(r1)). From these, A1
can compute
(2)
With these r0 and r1 values, A1 can now
impersonate user U in network N2 by pretending
to be U to initiate a registration protocol in net-
work N2 with administrator A2 and replaying the
id authorization request message, (c0,DU(c0))
previously used by user U in N1’s registration
protocol with A1. This will be correctly authenti-
cated by administrator A2 as having come from
user U since it was indeed signed by U. A2 then
returns c1* = DA2(c0) = DA2(EA1(r0) × H(r1)) =
DA2(EA1(r0)) × DA2(H(r1)). In order for A1 to
remove the blind factor DA2(EA1(r0)) to obtain
the anonymous authorization ID, id =
DA2(H(r1)), A1 legitimately (as itself) initiates a
registration protocol in network N2 with admin-
r
r D H r
D H r
A
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0
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n Figure 2. Registration protocol.
Mobile user, U Administrator, A
1. Generate: r0, r1.
2. Encryption: EA(r0).
3. Multiplication:
c0 = EA(r0) × H(r1).
→ c0,DU(c0)
4. Authenticate U.
If OK, then continue.
5. Sign:
c1 = DA(c0) = r0 × DA(H(r1)).
← c1
6. Receive: c1.
7. Remove blind factor:
id = c1 ÷ r0 = DA(H(r1)).
8. Verification:
if EA(id) ≠ H(r1) then abort.
9. Keep:
id = DA(H(r1)).
n Figure 3. Controlled connection protocol.
Mobile user, U Access point, C Administrator, A
1. Encryption:
c2 = EA(r1,DA(H(r1))).
→ c2
→ c2
2. Decryption:
(r′, t) = DA(c2).
3. Verification:
if H(r′) ≠ EA(t),
then abort.
4. Encryption:
c3 = KCA(r1,DA(H(r1))).
← c3
5. Decryption:
(r1′′, t′) = KCA
–1(c3).
6. Verification:
if H(r1′′ ) ≠ EA(t′),
then abort.
7. Generate ack.
← ack
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istrator A2 by sending the request (c0′ = EA1(r0),
DA1(c0′)) to A2, who correctly authenticates that
it came from A1 and returns c1′ = DA2(c0′) =
DA2(EA1(r0)). This c1′ is actually the blind factor
that A1 can now remove from c1* = DA2(EA1(r0))
× DA2(H(r1)) to obtain the valid id =
DA2(H(r1)). Therefore, A1 can use this id (meant
for U) to access network N2 as user U; this is an
impersonation attack by A1 against U.
NONTRIVIAL DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK BY
ANY UNAUTHORIZED PARTY AGAINST USER
We next show a nontrivial DoS attack by any
unauthorized party, I, who does not need to be a
legitimate user of any network. This attack caus-
es a legitimate user, U, to be denied access to a
network to which it is supposed to have access,
and is nontrivial in the sense that the administra-
tor, A, is unable to detect anything wrong with
the registration protocol. This scenario is illus-
trated in Fig. 6.
Consider that legitimate user U initiates a
normal registration protocol session with admin-
istrator A by sending the digitally signed mes-
sage (c0, DU(c0)). However, unauthorized party I
intercepts this and multiplies the first compo-
nent with EU(α), while the second component is
multiplied with α, where α is any arbitrary value.
I then forwards the resultant products, (c0 ×
EU(α), DU(c0) × α), to administrator A. Upon
receipt of this, A verifies the authenticity of the
message by using U’s public key, EU, to encrypt
the second component, DU(c0) × α, to obtain c0
× EU(α) and therefore successfully gets a match
with the received first component. Hence, as far
as A is concerned, legitimate user U has success-
fully authenticated itself to A and the message
received indeed came from U. Then administra-
tor A computes c1′ = DA(c0 × EU(α)) =
DA(EA(r0) × H(r1) × EU(α)) = (r0 × DA(H(r1) ×
EU(α)) and sends this back to legitimate user U.
However, U is unable to verify the authenticity
of this message and therefore aborts. Adminis-
trator A, on the other hand, thinks that the reg-
istration protocol session has successfully been
completed. This shows that the registration pro-
tocol fails to achieve its objective of fully authen-
ticating both parties(legitimate user U and
administrator A).
COUNTERMEASURES
The main problem we exploited in mounting our
two impersonation attacks is that during the reg-
istration protocol the network administrator can
be used as an oracle since the administrator
would decrypt (sign) and return any authentic c0
it receives. Furthermore, since the authenticated
c0 is merely signed by the user but does not con-
tain any timestamp, previously valid c0 values
can be replayed by an attacker for future com-
munications. Note that while He et al. did sug-
gest using timestamps, it was only for ensuring
the freshness of the authorized id, not for the
messages communicated between the parties in
both registration and controlled connection pro-
tocols. Therefore, the first countermeasure is
that all messages should be timestamped in
order to prevent such replay attacks.
Another countermeasure to complicate replay
attacks is to explicitly include both the sender’s
and receiver’s identities into a message that can
only be signed by (i.e., decrypted using the pri-
vate key of) the sender. For instance, if the id
authorization request message (c0,DU(c0)) sent
during the registration protocol from user U to
administrator A is changed to (c0,DU(c0 U A)),
and similarly the administrator’s reply, c1, to the
user is changed to c1′ = DA(c0 × A U), where 
denotes concatenation, our attacks would no
longer work since a malicious attacker would no
longer be able to replay previously valid mes-
sages as being sent from or to incorrect parties.
To prevent the nontrivial DoS attack
described earlier, we suggest using a challenge-
response mechanism [4] toward the end of the
registration protocol to allow administrator A to
verify that user U really received the correct c1.
n Figure 4. Impersonation attack by malicious user against administrator.
A2
A1
A1
U
Network 1 (N1)
Network 2 (N2)
n Figure 5. Impersonation attack by malicious administrator against user.
A2
A1
A1
U
Network 1 (N1)
Network 2 (N2)
PHAN LAYOUT  4/21/05  11:06 AM  Page 152
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Authorized licensed use limited to: LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on December 16, 2009 at 04:31 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
IEEE Communications Magazine • May 2005 153
This can be done, for example, by treating c1 as
a challenge to U; then U is further required to
sign this and return it as the response message
DU(c1), so A is assured that c1 is received cor-
rectly. A further weakness we exploited is that
any knowledge of (r1,DA(H(r1)) can be used to
gain access to the system during the controlled
connection protocol. No further authentication
is required of the user. This therefore highlights
that previous such pairs, although outdated and
no longer used, should not be disclosed to any-
one to prevent so-called garbage-man-in-the-
middle [5] attacks. Similarly, the shared session
key, KCA, between access point connector C and
administrator A during the controlled connec-
tion protocol should never be disclosed even
though outdated, since this would allow an
attacker to read previous c1 messages, obtain a
previously valid (r1,DA(H(r1))) pair, and hence
impersonate a legitimate user. In particular, the
lifetime of KCA must at least be longer than that
of (r1,DA(H(r1))).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed security limitations of the
authorized anonymous ID-based scheme pro-
posed by He et al. and given suggestions on how
to modify the scheme to counter such attacks.
We have one final concern relating to He et
al.’s suggestions to improve [1] their scheme by
the access authorization revocation and reconfu-
sion methods: The access authorization revoca-
tion method revokes a certain outdated
authorized anonymous ID. Meanwhile, the
reconfusion method allows the user to request
that the administrator generate a new autho-
rized anonymous ID to replace the old one.
Specifically, user U sends a reconfusion request
to administrator A that is merely a function of
the old authorized anonymous ID of U, two ran-
dom values chosen by U, and a secret key, KUA
also chosen by U for symmetric encryption
between U and A. From this, the administrator
generates the new authorized anonymous ID,
encrypts this with KUA, and sends the encrypted
value back to U.
This means that through the reconfusion
method, a malicious user or any attacker with
knowledge of a user’s old authorized anonymous
ID could obtain multiple new anonymous autho-
rized IDs, which he could use even if the old
authorized anonymous ID has been revoked via
the access authorization revocation method.
Therefore, we suggest that the reconfusion pro-
tocol should also check for freshness of the
reconfusion request (via timestamps or having
this protocol work in collaboration with the
access authorization revocation method) so that
new anonymous authorized IDs will not be gen-
erated if the reconfusion request contains a
revoked authorized anonymous ID.
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